Thirty days after the election, President Lee Jae-myung discussed inter-Korean relations at a press conference. Source: Korea.net

President Lee Jae Myung of South Korea has been vocal about his goals for improving inter-Korean relations, with a focus on deterrence and diplomacy. From suspending loudspeaker broadcasts along the border regions to talks of restoring the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) between North and South Korea, Lee has demonstrated his intentions for de-escalation and dialogue on the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, his administration has called for improved coordination with its US ally on both North Korea policy and potential US-DPRK dialogue. Nonetheless, improvements in inter-Korean relations face various obstacles.

Engagement vs. Hard-line Policy: A Brief Overview

Over time, South Korean administrations have flip-flopped between engagement policies – promoting dialogue, de-escalation, and mutual trust – and hard-line policies that more often prioritize deterrence and ‘tit-for-tat’ approaches to North Korean provocations. 

Started by Kim Dae Jung in 1998, South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” has been implemented on-and-off ever since, promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula via cooperation, dialogue, and economic assistance. Some administrations, however, believing in the ineffectiveness of such an engagement policy, have pursued a more hard-line strategy, often cutting off engagement with the North and emphasizing denuclearization as a prerequisite for future dialogue and economic incentives.

Critics argue that neither approach has been particularly effective at facilitating meaningful dialogue nor progress in denuclearization. In an article from the Stimson Center, South Korea’s engagement policies are said to be too idealistic, to the detriment of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, the hard-line policies are said to lead to further North Korean provocations without successful coercion for denuclearization.

Kim Jong Un and former president Moon Jae-in met at the border between North and South back in 2018 when both states were still actively engaging in peace talks. Source: Reuters. 

Importantly, given the differing approaches taken by progressive and conservative camps, South Korea’s policies towards North Korea are constrained to the short term. This means that, as neither engagement nor hard-line policy approaches are consistently favored in South Korea, it is difficult to witness the long-term impacts of related policy decisions. 

President Lee Jae Myung’s policy approach towards North Korea certainly aligns more closely with the engagement camp. His administration has emphasized goals for de-escalation of military tensions on the Korean Peninsula and an eventual resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. Notably, in the month since taking office, Lee has both ended the loudspeaker broadcasts in border regions and expressed intentions to stop anti-North Korea leaflet campaigns. However, straying from a conventional engagement approach, Lee also emphasizes deterrence via a strengthened US-ROK alliance. Thus, he is said to take a more pragmatic policy approach towards North Korea. 

Lee’s Conundrum: North Korea’s “Two Hostile States” Doctrine

Lee’s engagement policies towards North Korea face significant obstacles. For instance, in 2024, North Korea announced its “Two Hostile States” doctrine, which referred to the two Koreas as ‘hostile’ and distinct, separated states. Notably, this involved a change to North Korea’s constitution, which previously sought reunification with the South based on a shared sense of identity, to now prioritize building a distinctly North Korean identity with no focus on reunification.

Analysts argue that this doctrine fits into North Korea’s goals of isolating South Korea while forging stronger alliances with Russia and China and seeking recognition from the United States. The regime has seen some success in this plan, given the recent deepening of ties with Russia, which are said to have lessened the regime’s need for cooperation and engagement with South Korea.

Kim Jong Un and President Vladimir Putin have met several times since 2023 and are scheduled to meet again in Beijing in early September together with Xi Jinping, signaling their commitment to a new world order beyond the US hegemony. Source: AP Image Source: Dong-A Ilbo

Notably, some view the regime’s shift towards an independent North Korean state as a stepping stone for dialogue with the United States without the interference of South Korea. Following this argument, South Korea faces difficulties not just in engaging in dialogue with North Korea, but also in its potential isolation in the event of US-DPRK negotiations. 

Accordingly, experts assert that Lee will need to closely coordinate with the Trump administration on North Korea policy directions. At the same time, his administration will need to improve ties with important partners in the region to prevent future isolation. Indeed, since he took office in early June, Lee has expressed a need for policy coordination with the United States to facilitate improved inter-Korean relations, as well as a goal for improving communication with neighboring states to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Potential for and Implications of Future US-DPRK Dialogue

Should Lee’s administration closely coordinate with the United States, experts argue that future US-DPRK dialogue has the potential to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table and improve the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Such talks are therefore quite important for inter-Korean relations.

That said, it is unclear whether the Trump administration nor Kim Jong Un is willing to engage in these discussions. Some analysts argue that North Korea might not feel a need for engagement with the United States, given its ultimate goals of nuclear development and the regime’s deepening ties with Russia and China. Others further emphasize that North Korea’s goals of attaining US recognition as a nuclear-armed state also hinder the likelihood of the regime participating in denuclearization talks. Moreover, while US President Trump has indicated his interest in future US-DPRK talks, the United States is currently preoccupied with other global crises and is thus unlikely to pursue such dialogue in the near future.

In an era where North Korea is less willing to pursue diplomacy with South Korea and the United States, some see a potential Trump-Kim summit backed by close coordination between the Trump and Lee administrations as the breakthrough South Korea needs to restart inter-Korean dialogue and promote peace on the peninsula.

However, even if an opportunity for US-DPRK dialogue does present itself in the future, Lee’s administration faces risks of being left out of the discussions. Therefore, some critics call for a focus on inter-Korean relations that does not rely too heavily on the potential for US-DPRK talks. And while Lee’s pragmatic approach to North Korea certainly calls for increased coordination with the United States, his recent cabinet nominations, for instance, also demonstrate goals for trust-building and eventual inter-Korean cooperation.

President Trump and President Lee met in August and discussed future cooperation in engagement with North Korea. Source: Hankyoreh. 

Future of Inter-Korean Relations under the Lee Administration

Critics of South Korea’s main lines of policy towards North Korea – engagement and hard-line approaches – have sometimes called for a more pragmatic North Korea policy. In this sense, President Lee Jae Myung’s pragmatic approach, de-escalating military tensions and encouraging dialogue whilst emphasizing deterrence via a strong US-ROK alliance, might inspire hope for improved inter-Korean relations. 

Nevertheless, the Lee administration faces numerous practical difficulties. On one hand, South Korea is seeking dialogue and engagement with a presumably unwilling partner. Certainly, the North Korean regime could accept the Lee administration’s calls for dialogue and trust-building measures. However, the “Two Hostile States” doctrine makes the future of these engagements quite uncertain. Moreover, the regime’s desire for nuclear power status makes denuclearization talks increasingly unlikely.

On the other hand, Lee’s approach towards North Korea falls into a broader pragmatic foreign policy of improving relations with key global partners, including Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. Critics argue that this approach is risky, given the conflicting interests of these partner states and the difficulties navigating between them. 

Despite these difficulties, there is still hope for improved inter-Korean relations in the near future. An article from 38 North, for instance, argues that Lee can at the very least increase North Korea’s willingness for dialogue by maintaining his administration’s emphasis on peaceful coexistence rather than unification by force, as well as by carefully navigating deterrence measures while avoiding overly aggressive posturing. 

In this sense, Lee’s pragmatic approach to North Korea has some merit, as trust-building measures and engagement efforts can increase the likelihood of future dialogue. Moreover, by closely aligning its North Korea policy with the United States, Lee’s administration can theoretically ensure that South Korea is not left out of future negotiations. And in the event that North Korea prioritizes its nuclear weapons program over diplomacy with these allies, strengthening the US-ROK alliance and otherwise building deterrence capabilities can help address some of the practical security concerns of hard-liners. 

Lee’s North Korea policy is pragmatic and could ultimately reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula, without raising significant security concerns, as in the case of conventional engagement policies. His administration does indeed face numerous obstacles that make inter-Korean dialogue unlikely in the near future. That said, if Lee strictly follows his pragmatic approach throughout his term, he can contribute to building a more peaceful and cooperative environment on the Korean Peninsula that is conducive to dialogue.

 

Stephanie Arentz is a recent graduate of Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) and a 2022 Global Korea Scholar. She received her Master’s Degree in Global Affairs and Policy, with a focus in East Asian Studies and International Security & Foreign Policy. Prior to her studies at Yonsei University, Stephanie attended the University of California in Santa Barbara (UCSB), where she wrote her undergraduate thesis on the subject of North Korea. Her primary research interests include East Asian international relations and inter-Korean relations.

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